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Abstract
The marketing literature provides a solid understanding of auctions regarding final sales prices and many aspects of the processes that unfold
to result in those outcomes. This research complements those perspectives by first presenting a new bidder behavior model that shows the role
of emergent network ties among bidders on the auction outcome. Dyadic ties are identified as the bid and counter-bid patterns of interactions
between bidders that unfold throughout the duration of an auction. These structures are modeled using network analyses, which enables: (1) a
richer understanding of detailed auction processes, both within auctions and across auctions of multiple lots, (2) a mapping of the processes to the
forecast of prices and the trajectory toward final sales prices, (3) the clear and early identification of key bidders who are influential to the bidding
action and who impact final auction sales prices, and (4) the results clearly show that the network exchange patterns are significant and contribute
to an understanding of auction processes and outcomes above and beyond simple economic predictors such as the number of bids or bidders or the
bidders’ economic status. We conclude by providing some managerial implications for online auction houses and bidders.
© 2014 New York University. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Introduction
Auctions are an important arm of retailing, along with
shopping centers, department stores, big box stores, online out-
lets, and the like. Indeed, many contemporary auctions are quite
large and therefore important, selling such diverse items as
fish (cf., Tokyo’s Tsukiji market, founded 1923, $5.5B annual,
tsukiji-market.or.jp), real estate (f.1957, $.75B, williamsauc-
tion.com), antiques (f.1937, teppergalleries.com), thoroughbred
horses (f.1935, $1B, keeneland.com), and so forth. Two of the
best-known premier auction houses are Christie’s (f.1766, $5B,
christies.com) and Sotheby’s (f.1744, $5B, sothebys.com), each
of which made their names selling high-end works of art, and
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both of which now offer a much broader range of SKUs. Yet
dominating them all, in size and scope, are online auctions such
as eBay (f.1995, $12B), which sells an enormously wide variety
of items, from paperclips to Ferraris. Online auctions warrant
study, as attested by the presence of the topic in the Journal  of
Retailing.
In practice, the auction house manager’s most important ques-
tion has always been, “How do I achieve the most profitable sales
prices?” Accordingly, there is a long-standing literature in mar-
keting and economics on the auction outcomes of final sales
prices. In addition, marketers have also begun to examine the
processes that unfold during auctions that yield the final sales
prices. Our research combines the two perspectives, in modeling
the bidding processes as they develop and showing that doing
so helps predict final outcome sales prices.
Our research models the structure of bids and counter-bids,
representing the dynamic patterns of interactions as networks.
As we describe in more detail shortly, network models are par-
ticularly applicable to bidding exchange data because bidders’
behaviors are not independent. If a researcher is modeling final
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jretai.2014.08.003
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sales prices with auction items as the unit of analysis, it might be
the case that those units of observation are independent (except
perhaps in circumstances in which bidders cross-bid for compa-
rable items across different auction slots, as described shortly),
thus a standard general linear model may be used. However, the
nature of the bid-counter-bid exchanges is that they are inter-
dependent, rendering many statistical models inappropriate and
requiring new and relevant modeling methodology. Network
models were created to model structures of interconnections, for
example, communications links among people, transportation
links between city hubs, and so forth, thus addressing the concern
of the bidder inter-dependence perfectly. Network models are
also ideally suited to helping the auction house manager identify
the most important bidders, so the managers know which bid-
ders should be paid greater or lesser attention. We shall show that
these important bidders are not necessarily simply the wealthiest
patrons, for example, but they are those whose bid-counter-bid
patterns are most influential.
We next review the literature and provide a context for our
research. We examine both sales outcomes and auction pro-
cesses. Extant research on auction processes tends to track
aggregate activity over time, whereas we seek to understand
auction processes at an even more precise, micro level, of what
each bidder does and what the subsequent reactions of other bid-
ders are to each action, thereby investigating what is occurring
among the auction bidders to give rise to the aggregate processes,
which in turn yield the sales outcomes.
Literature Review
Auctions have a long tradition as an important means of sales
in the marketplace and as a focus of study in marketing and the
Journal of  Retailing, as researchers acknowledge the different
channels of sales and distribution (cf., Brown and Dant 2009).
For example, recent articles in the Journal  of  Retailing  have
examined the mechanism of “name your own price” auctions
(Joo, Mazumdar, and Raj 2012), the effects of global markets for
internationally sold products (Hu and Wang 2010), and online
interfaces for eliciting and articulating bids and sales (Spann
et al. 2012). However, before discussing current developments,
let us begin with more fundamental research questions. We first
consider the literature on auction outcomes, and then we turn to
the literature on auction processes.
Auction Outcomes
The primary goal of an auction house is naturally to seek
to maximize its profits. Not surprisingly, the academic literature
has followed suit, traditionally focused on modeling auction out-
comes. For example, Kamins, Drèze, and Folkes (2004) studied
the effect of various referent price points as signals on the auc-
tions’ final sales prices. As anticipated, high signals (i.e., the
seller’s reserve price) yielded higher prices than low signals (i.e.,
minimum bid information). Perhaps more interesting was their
finding that realized prices were maximized in the face of no
anchoring information (no minimum or reserve mentioned, p.
625). When no referent signals were available, participants took
the number of bidders as a cue to the desirability of the item
sought, with more bidders driving prices upward.
The marketing and economics literature on auction outcomes
is extensive. Final sales prices have been studied as a function of
various reference prices (Dholakia and Simonson 2005; Kamins,
Drèze, and Folkes 2004; Popkowski Leszczyc, Qiu, and He
2009). Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) found that sellers requesting
higher minimum bids created auction environments that discour-
aged bidders from entering into the bid. As a result, fewer bidders
participated, resulting in less competition. With no driving force
toward higher sales prices, the auctions yielded lower expected
profits, compared to the profits obtained when lower minimum
bids were posted. Lower minimum bids provide lower barriers
to entry, which encourages more participants to bid. Economists
have always maintained that more bidding participants yield
greater competition, which therefore result in relatively higher
final sales prices (Levin and Smith 1996).
Sales outcomes have also been studied as a function of design
elements of the auction formats themselves, such as whether
bids are sealed or transparent (Cheema, Chakravarti, and Sinha
2012; Jap 2002; Klemperer 1998; Lucking-Reiley 1999). For
example, English (ascending) auctions tend to generate larger
surpluses than second-price auctions or Dutch (descending) auc-
tions (Milgrom and Weber 1982), and auctions designated to
raise money to benefit charities tend to yield higher bid prices,
whether all proceeds or a lesser percentage of sales are donated
(Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc 2009b; Popkowski Leszczyc
and Rothkopf 2010).
Auction outcomes have also been studied as a function of
characteristics of the products being sold. For example, higher
prices and intentions toward willingness to pay higher prices
occur when the risk of the purchase is reduced, such as when
bidders can observe indicators of product quality and auction
credibility via offers of money back guarantees or product
authentication certification (Li, Srinivasan, and Sun 2009). With-
out objective information providing such assurances of quality,
bidders make inferences from other cues, such as indicators
regarding buyers’ and sellers’ reputations. For example, Cheema
(2008) found that potential auction buyers took longer to make
purchase decisions, paid more attention to and were less toler-
ant of surcharges (such as shipping costs) compared to shopping
and bidding considerations for merchandize posted from higher
reputation sellers. Subramaniam and Venkatesh (2009) also
demonstrated that selling items separately, rather than bundling
them together, yielded higher prices, as long as the number of
bidders reached a critical mass.
Auction Processes
Researchers have also been interested in examining aspects
of auction processes that give rise to final sales prices. Indeed,
as Wang et al. (2008, p. 1100) state, obviously final prices
matter, “but there is increasing evidence that what occurs during
the auction also matters.” For example, “name your price”
auctions would seem like a generous pricing environment for
the buyer—theoretically, it should result in price minimization
for buyers, and therefore optimal prices from the buyer’s
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perspective. Yet it is clear that bidders do not take advantage of
the price naming and price minimizing as they might, because
such auctions typically result in bidders posting and paying
higher prices than normative decision making would predict
(Spann and Tellis 2006). Chernev (2003) found that bidders
preferred auction formats in which prices could be chosen
(“select your price”) over auctions in which prices would
need to be generated (“name your price”), even though the
price generation format allows the bidder greater flexibility
and precision. The dilemma seems to be that the “name your
price” auction mechanism is not as buyer-friendly as it might
at first seem, in part because price generation creates so much
uncertainty and psychological discomfort that eliciting precise
bids led to diminished decision confidence in the bidders.
Some research on auction processes emphasizes the eco-
nomic concern for optimizing outcomes. For example, final sales
prices can be predicted and even maximized as captured in real
time forecasting (Dass, Jank, and Shmueli 2011; Dass and Reddy
2008). Sequences of online bids can help predict who will bid
when (Park and Bradlow 2005), and the influence of bidders’
nearest neighbors can be modeled to enhance the accuracy in
forecasting (Zhang, Jank, and Shmueli 2010). Such detailed
sequential analyses of the auction process as it unfolds have
even shown that bidders themselves are conscious and sensitive
to the sequential auction environment, as when documenting
demonstrably greater movement in price increases at the begin-
ning and end of auctions, especially for expensive items (Bapna,
Jank, and Shmueli 2008).
Other research on auction processes tends to emphasize the
psychological concern regarding the bidders’ behaviors. For
example, in studies of buyer–seller bidding dynamics, Jap (2002,
2007) watched price drops as they occurred throughout bid-
ding periods. She found that when prices dropped a lot, bidders
experienced diminished satisfaction, even though bidders should
recognize the greater economic savings. The dissatisfaction was
attributed to the implication that the early prices were too high.
Social psychological processes have also been shown to be
important, perhaps explaining how it is that more bidders cre-
ate greater competition, in turn raising sales prices. Simonsohn
and Ariely (2008) demonstrated the signaling value that bid-
ders obtained by simply observing others; essentially a virtuous
cycle develops in that bidders were often attracted to bid on
auction items in part due to the very popularity of that par-
ticular item’s auction attraction. Similarly, Ku, Malhotra, and
Murnighan (2005) identified “auction fever,” where bidders
engage in a fierce battle to win the item in an auction due to
competitive arousal.
Bidder interactions have been shown to give rise to com-
petitive responses among bidders even when those bidders are
essentially anonymous (Ding et al. 2005; Fay and Laran 2009;
Jap 2007; Jap and Haruvy 2008). The notion that a bidder
responds to other bidders may be easier to understand in a tra-
ditional in-person auction (e.g., Christie’s), in which bidders
identify each other in the audience by face or by a paddle num-
ber. Yet online auctions are less anonymous than one might think.
Bidders become familiar with other bidders by their auction user-
name, and competitor bidders are personified by the actions they
take (e.g., as a bidder who seeks to win at any costs, etc.). Jap
and Haruvy (2008) and Sinha and Greenleaf (2000) have found
that bidders were quite adept at personifying others’ motives,
for example, as being aggressive.
Given that auctions comprise bidders interacting with each
other and responding to others’ bidding behaviors, a full under-
standing of an auction requires knowledge of these interactions.
Our research models the bid-counter-bid exchanges as inter-
dependent elements in a network. Bidders do not rationally post
multiple bids simultaneously for the same item (and in many auc-
tions are precluded from doing so); instead, bidders post bids in
response subsequent to a competitor having posted a dominat-
ing bid. The fact that bids are submitted contingent upon other
bids by other bidders indicates that bidders’ behaviors are inter-
dependent (Chan, Kadiyali, and Park 2007; Spann et al. 2012;
Suter and Hardesty 2005).
Auctions and  the  Potential  Utility  of  Networks
Recognizing the social nature of auctions, Hinz and Spann
(2008) investigated the extent to which social networks might
be leveraged in the study of bids and sales prices. They note that
the Internet promotes various forms of collaboration, such as
information-sharing via social networks, and yet to date, “Pre-
vious research on .  . .auctions has not examined the impact of
information diffusion via digital and social networks on bidding
behavior” (p. 352). They make the case that “bidders with many
contacts are more likely to have access to a large amount of
information” (p. 365) and they test their theorizing both in a lab
study and by extracting the social actors and their links from a
real online social network for those people who participated as
bidders in the auction they studied. In our research, we do not
have the luxury of an intact social network, online or otherwise,
from which to draw links, nor would it be likely that auction
managers could enact their use. Instead, we will use the actual
behaviors of the exchanges, the bid-counter-bids themselves, to
build the structure of bidding networks.
Wang and Chiu (2008) similarly investigated the collabo-
rative nature of online information in their study of reputation
systems and recommended sellers in online auctions. Their
research used the relational ties between traders to improve the
online system so that it would be less susceptible to manipula-
tion and collusion to spuriously enhance a seller’s own ratings.
Certainly such a service enhances the online auction experience
for all involved, bidders and auction house managers. In our
research, we will be modeling actual bidding behavior, which,
while admittedly could be gamed, is less subjective than ratings
of customer satisfaction.
We will use social networks to study the inter-connections
among the bidders. Our links are not social in the classic
sense—our bidders are not necessarily friends, they may not
even know each other. They are connected by their bidding
and counter-bidding exchanges. Their connection is essentially
competitive.
Other research has examined different kinds of intercon-
nections. For example, Anwar, McMillan, and Zheng (2006)
note that much of the literature treats auctions as if they run
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independently of each other, with bidders participating in only
one auction. Yet in many auctions, particularly online auctions
like eBay, numerous substitutable goods are auctioned concur-
rently. They found that a significant portion (20–30%) of the
bidders they studied bid across multiple auction lots, and these
cross-bidders paid lower prices on average—almost a 10% dis-
count. While they studied price reductions due to competing
goods, characterizing eBay as an exemplar of a “clearinghouse
for the sale of a large number of homogeneous goods” (p. 308),
in our auction of relatively high-end art, the goods are more dis-
tinctive. There were several artists who had contributed more
than one work of art, and to an art investor, one piece by a par-
ticular artist may be consumed as relatively homogeneous as
another piece by that artist, however, the art community would
presumably see the lots as unique and not commodity-like, and
therefore in less competition with each other.
These results in Anwar, McMillan, and Zheng (2006) are
consistent with those of Chan, Kadiyali, and Park (2007). While
they did not study cross-bidding per se, they found that will-
ingness to pay declined as more similar items were listed for
bidding. When there was comparable quality available across
homogeneous auction listings, there was less differential prefer-
ence to any given lot item, reducing any perceived need to pay
higher prices for an item that was attainable with some search
at lower costs.
In another study of cross-bidding, Kayhan, McCart, and
Bhattacherjee (2010) found that five percent of auction winners
used such a cross-bidding strategy, and in doing so, realized
a significant price discount (p. 329). The environment in which
cross-bidding may occur and benefit the sellers include (p. 326):
(1) that there is the “simultaneous occurrence of multiple auc-
tions of the same product ending at approximately the same
time,” (2) that bidders “must be able to continually monitor
these auctions and the standing bids at each auction, and decide
on which auction to bid and for what amount,” and (3) the bid-
der “must avoid multiple bids in different auctions at any given
point in time, in order to avoid winning multiple items.” Given
that the price discounts for bidders “translate into lost revenues
for sellers” (p. 331), the authors recommend that the auctions
have different ending times, or that the auction house sell one-
of-a-kind products. In our auction data, all lots are available
for the same length of time, and as we mentioned, there were
several lots available from each of several artists. However, the
majority of the auction entries were unique and the items’ price
tags contribute to the characterization of the high-end art being
somewhat exclusive.
The interdependencies among the bidders has also yielded
some methodological concerns. For example, Li, Perrigne, and
Vuong (2002) showed, using simulated bid data, how to obtain
nonparametric estimates of bidders’ value distributions under
the assumption that the bidders’ valuations are affiliated, roughly
meaning correlated. We agree with the philosophy underly-
ing their approach, namely that the as bidders reveal their
intention to purchase auction lots, their revealed and emerg-
ing values affect and are affected by those of other bidders.
Network modeling need not make the assumption that the bid-
ders’ valuations are known, even to themselves. We will track
the bid-counter-bid patterns to see how those values arise and
develop.
As we can see, auctions are inherently interdependent mar-
kets, and our research is intended to contribute to the literature
by illuminating the specific dynamics of the interactive bidding
patterns. Our research examines patterns of connections that
give rise to an implicit network among bidders. Using network
methods to model bidder interactions also provides us a way
to identify the relatively small number of highly influential key
bidders who play an important role in the auction process and
outcomes. An important means of capturing network connec-
tions is to compute centrality indices for the actors (in our case,
bidders) embedded in the network. In a standard social network,
the relational ties may reflect friendships, so high scores reflect
actors who are central or amidst many friends, and actors with
lower indices are more on the periphery of the network (e.g.,
Freeman 1979). As we shall show, for our purposes, such indices
may be interpreted as measures of the extent to which a bidder
is key to the auction—deeply engaged in bid-counterbid actions
and reactions. These central bidders are in the midst of the action
in the network, in direct competition with other bidders, and
naturally playing an influential role on other bidders (Bonacich
1987; Nieminen 1973).
Next, we describe our data and networks in greater detail. We
then test our model.
The  Auction  Data
The data in this study are from second price simultaneous
online auctions. The bidding has an ascending format; specifi-
cally, the rules posted on the site state as follows: “The closing
bid for a lot is the highest bid at the time at which a particular
lot’s bidding has ended. No further bids can be made after the
close of the bidding for that particular lot. The closing bid is con-
sidered a winning bid.” It allows proxy bidding similar to that of
eBay auctions (Roth and Ockenfels 2002). It is also a simulta-
neous auction, meaning simply that many items are available for
bidding and sale at the same time. The company that organizes
the auction specializes in a line of contemporary international
art that is a leading emerging art market ($450mn, annual). In
this particular art market, this online auction house sold more
($10.1mn) than Sotheby’s ($5.2mn) or Christie’s ($8.7mn).
Our source auction house organizes four to five annual sales
events (like Christie’s and Sotheby’s) where 100–200 art items
are bid upon in a three-day online auction. Prior to the auc-
tion, a catalog of available items is prepared (like Christie’s
and Sotheby’s), with information about the items to be auc-
tioned, including the title of the artwork, its size, media of the
artwork, and the artist. In terms of value information, only pre-
auction estimates are provided. The auction house consults with
the consignor, seller, art experts, and professional art appraisers
to derive this estimated value. There may be situations where
a reserve price is set, but it is not disclosed to the buyers. The
auction house contacts potential bidders via email and courier
service, and sends them event invitations and catalogs. Further,
the house organizes multiple viewing parties across the world,
where potential bidders are invited to come and examine the art
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Table 1
Summary data description.
Mean SD Min. Max.
No. of bidders per lot 6.35 2.47 2 14
No. of unique lots bid per bidder 4.93 7.95 1 65
No. of bids per lot 15.47 7.46 2 48
Opening bid $19,343 $36,663 $650 $300,000
Pre-auction low estimates of the lots $24,128 $45,747 $795 $375,000
Pre-auction high estimates of the lots $31,065 $60,351 $1,025 $475,000
Realized sales value of the lots $62,065 $133,198 $3,135 $1,486,100
Realized price of lots per sq. inch $108.77 $225.49 $1.40 $1,865.42
works. Potential bidders register to pre-qualify, which includes
a credit check and a selection of an online nickname to be used
throughout the auction.
Bidding in these auctions starts with a value lower than the
low estimate value. Bidders can bid only the incremental value
that is preset by the auction house. If they decide on posting a
higher bid than the pre-set value, an automated bidding system
will place proxy bids on their behalf at the pre-set value. The
auction has a fixed ending time and date set by the auction house,
and the ending time for each lot is automatically extended until
no new bid is submitted for three consecutive minutes so as to
preclude sniping or last-minute frenetic bidding.
Auction houses evaluate their performance in part by compar-
ing final realized sales prices with the lower bound pre-auction
estimates, that is, predicted sales prices. Typically, the auction
house manager and analysts use this ratio as a measure of the
extent of successful performance of the items and the auctions.
Accordingly, to maximize the utility of our findings and map
directly onto practice, we use this ratio as an outcome variable
and refer to it as auction  surplus.3
During the three-day auction, 256 bidders competed against
each other for 199 lots (paintings, drawings) by 70 artists (who
presented an average of 2.8 lots per artist). A total of 3080 bids
were placed. Most of the bidders did not use proxy bids (68%),
and of those who did, 76% of these bidders used 8 or fewer proxy
bids, and the mean number placed was 11. (We will say more
about proxy bids shortly.) Table 1 contains the basic descriptive
statistics: on average, 6.35 bidders bid on each lot, each bid-
der bid on 4.93 lots, each lot received 15.47 bids. The average
realized lot price was $62,065.
Network  Model  of  Bidder  Interactions
One of the reasons for the absence from the literature of
studies that focus on the micro patterns of bids and counterbids
is that interdependent data render many traditional analytical
3 Auction lots will obviously vary in their mean expected values (e.g., some
paintings are expected to fetch more than others), so to test the sensitivity of
the results (presented shortly), we also modeled the ratio of realized prices to
pre-auction average estimates, rather than the lower (or higher) bounds. While
the coefficient estimates were not numerically exactly identical, the pattern of
results were the same, in terms of which effects were significant, and their signs
and relative magnitudes. Given the similarities across the analyses, we opted to
retain the surplus ratio measure that actual auction house managers use.
techniques inappropriate. For example, while auction outcomes
such as final sales price may be modeled using statistical tech-
niques such as regression, the auction process data represent
contingent interconnections. Many statistical methods assume
independent observations and thus are less than optimal given
that the very phenomena of interest are the interactions that
violate assumptions of independence. Some other auctions
researchers have identified this issue (cf., Dass, Jank, and
Shmueli 2011) and in this paper, we study the viability and
utility of network methods for studying the interconnected
structures that arise from auctions.
To study the inter-connectivity, we use network analytical
techniques, drawn from graph theory in mathematics and cre-
ated for the express purpose of analyzing observations that are
interdependent and for modeling patterns of interconnections
(cf., Heider 1958; Iacobucci and Hopkins 1992; Knoke and
Yang 2007; Marsden 1990). Networks are increasingly being
acknowledged as an important paradigm for understanding a
variety of marketing exchanges, such as business to business
relationships, or customer exchanges in online social networks
(Keeling, McGoldrick, and Sadhu 2013; Spralls, Hunt, and
Wilcox 2011). Structurally, the dynamics of the auction pro-
cess involve interactions among bidders, in the form of the
bid-counterbid actions and responses. Bidders respond to bids in
a developing sequence of bids, thereby also responding to other
bidders. Such interactions and patterns of connections between
bidders are intriguing theoretically and challenging analytically,
thus making them one of the most important research priorities
identified as yet understudied in the academic realm of auctions
(Cheema et al. 2005). We examine the patterns of dyadic ties of
bidders who compete against each other in the auction. A bid is
posted in response to an updated current price, and effectively
one bidder is responding to the actions of another, and as more
bidders enter the auction, the pairwise interactions expand into
a fuller bidding network. The dyads represent direct interactions
between pairs of bidders, and as the broader network emerges,
it becomes clearer that each bidder is reciprocally responding to
many additional parties or bidders.
While many networks are social in nature, in our auction
data, two bidders may not know each other (except through their
online nicknames and observing their bidding behavior). How-
ever, there are at least two reasons that network models may be
applicable, and if so, highly useful given their focus on inter-
connectivity. First, network analyses have been used to capture
many contexts of interconnectivity that are not social, including
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transportation routes, electrical circuits, business alliances, and
so forth (Spralls, Hunt, and Wilcox 2011). Lovejoy and Sinha
(2010) have noted that positing a tie between two nodes does not
necessarily imply that the two actors know each other or commu-
nicate with each other. Network analysis is a class of analytical
tools that may be applied to numerous substantive data, as any
modeling technique; in the abstract, a network comprises nodes
and the links that connect them. In our case, the nodes are bid-
ders, and the links capture the patterns of bids and counterbids.
The emergent network forms as bidders influence each other’s
behavior, in turn affecting both auction processes and outcomes.
Second, it has been shown that in fact bidders do become famil-
iar with each other and other bidders’ bidding strategies (i.e.,
timing, frequency, bid increments, etc.), as they mutually bid on
some common lots over the course of the auction, even if they do
not communicate directly (Brusco and Lopomo 2002; Kwasnica
and Sherstyuk 2007; Phillips, Menkhaus, and Coatney 2003).
Linkages between pairs of nodes are denoted in an adjacency
matrix, whose form takes equal numbers of rows and columns,
one each for each node. Even though the ties represent funda-
mental dyadic interactions (e.g., Krackhardt and Kilduff 2002),
the matrices typically reveal concentrated groups of actors
interacting with each other, certainly well beyond statistical
randomness (Barabási and Albert 1999; Bonacich 1972). The
challenge in network theory is to analyze the data properly,
taking into account the inter-dependence among the nodes,
vis-à-vis the linkages (Burt and Bittner 1981).
To illustrate the network concepts in the auction context, con-
sider the bidding process depicted in Fig. 1. Fig. 1a (the first
table) presents a portion of a bid history of sequential bids that
unfold in real time, from December 5th at 10:30 p.m. through
3 a.m. the following morning. There are three bidders (in this
excerpt) with online nicknames Paul, Kyozaan, and Anony3.
The bidding begins (at the bottom of the first table) with a bid
from Anony3, and a counterbid by Kyozaan, and back again,
repeatedly bidding and counter-bidding three times, so in graph
theory, we would link these bidder-nodes with a value of 3,
very quickly building up a dyad that looks like Fig. 1c (to the
right). The fifth bid in the auction comes from a new party, Paul,
thus, a new node is added in Fig. 1d. Collecting all the bidding
links results in the final Fig. 1e, showing how graph theory may
be used to represent the bids and counterbids as a network tie
between any pair of bidders who place a bid or react to another’s
bid.
Most bids were personally and intentionally posted, but some
were posted via proxy bids; an authorization by the bidder to
respond and increase the standing bid. For our purposes, the bid-
counter-bid exchanges comprise the structure of the network,
whether a bid was manually and willfully entered, or posted via
the proxy system at the bidder’s behest. We are using bidding
Fig. 1. Formation of a bidder network. Figures (a) and (b) track the bids and counter bids of two different auction lot items. Each table is read from the bottom—an
online nickname is identified for the bidder, as is the bid offered. The rows above illustrate the subsequent counter-bids and bidders. Taking each bid-to-counterbid
link as a network connection, Figures (c)–(e) are graphical representations of the links that emerge from the bid-counterbid exchanges.
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ties as the connective links in our network; we are not claiming
that a pair of bidders are friends or have any other dyadic rela-
tionship. Furthermore, given the pre-sets in this auction, which
are common among auctions, we chose to model the number
of bids rather than bidding increments, but our results do not
change if values are substituted. Finally, our results replicated
whether we included the proxy bids or not.
For single-item auctions, the graph would be complete. How-
ever, our auction was a “simultaneous auction,” which is simply
a sales event in which many items are available for bidding at the
same time. Each bidder can bid for several items at once, thus
generating two types of bidder connections, one within an item
and another across multiple items. Even aside from eBay, simul-
taneous auctions have long been a popular auction design, used
for selling a wide range of objects, including FCC radio spectrum
(McAfee and McMillan 1996; Milgrom 1998), U.S. treasury
bills (Rothkopf, Pekec, and Harstad, 1998), timber, and cars
(Kwasnica and Sherstyuk 2007). Researchers have identified
simultaneous auctions as an important and understudied topic
within the auctions literature (Jap and Naik 2008; Klemperer
1999), particularly given their greater complexity (Haruvy and
Popkowski Leszczyc 2009a; Haruvy et al. 2008). For our pur-
poses, a simultaneous online auction will allow us to understand
interconnections among bidders for a single item, as well as
among bidding between multiple items.
A simultaneous auction allows us to model the structure of
interconnections formed by the bidding and counter-bidding for
any given auction item, as well as the bidding patterns across
different items. We might choose to create separate graphs, one
for each item, particularly if our interest was focused on the
items themselves. Our interest is more on the bidders, and how
they bid and counterbid, to see how they compete for items, both
within a lot as well as across auction lots. Network ties across
items is represented in a second table, Fig. 1b, and in Fig. 1e,
we aggregate the bid-counterbid exchanges collectively, result-
ing in the addition of more nodes and more links to represent
the growing auction bidding patterns. Even the simple patterns
depicted in Fig. 1e show distinct roles among the bidders. For
example, compared to the others, Anony3 seems to be the least
involved, whereas Kyozaan stands out because the greater fre-
quencies of bids and counter-bids with others. Let us define the
remaining network terms and notation, and then we will turn to
the concept of central bidders, and how to measure and identify
them in a network.
The bidder network is defined as a set of g bidders whose
relationship is based on whether bidder nj and bidder nk bid
sequentially on a lot where nj, nk ∈  N; N  = {1, 2, .  . ., g}. The
g ×  g  symmetric matrix X  contains elements (X)jk = p, where p
is the number of times bidders nj and nk bid sequentially on
lots in the auction, and p  = {0, 1, 2, .  . ., P}, where P is the
maximum number of consecutive bids placed in the auction.
Each data value represents each actor or bidder at one point
in time for one auction item. With subsequent bid-counterbid
interactions, the matrices build to aggregate networks that may
be examined per auction item or per time point, and so forth, and
these networks allow us to understand the unfolding patterns of
bidding.
Key Bidders  and  Centrality
In addition to examining the interactions among participating
bidders, researchers have long hypothesized that not all bidders
are created equal. As Bapna et al. (2004) have suggested, it
is not simply the number of bidders that contributes to the auc-
tion and accompanying pricing dynamics; instead, some bidders
have more of an effect than others. For example, the auctions
literature has contemplated and demonstrated the role of expe-
rienced bidders (Wilcox 2000). Even controlling for expertise,
it would be theoretically interesting and managerially useful (to
the auction manager, for example) if key bidders were iden-
tifiable during the auctions as a function of their engagement
behavior. Once identified, such as by their early bidding entry
or their intense bid-counterbid exchanges, their bidding activity
would be expected to be very influential in terms of lot selections
and values posted (Roth and Ockenfels 2002). Thus, while a sim-
ple economic prediction would forecast sales prices increasing
as a function of the sheer number of bidders, due to the increase
in competition (Wood et al. 2005), other researchers postulate
that some bidders are special, and their presence in an auction
determines or at least contributes to its results. We shall show
that identifying such important bidders by their attributes such
as wallet size is nowhere near as effective in understanding auc-
tions, or predicting final sales outcomes, as identifying those
key bidders as defined on the basis of their network of bidding
activity.
Specifically, in our study, three bidder descriptors are com-
puted for every time period to examine how the bidders’
positions stabilize or change. The first is called degree central-
ity index CD, which is computed and normalized as (Knoke and
Yang 2007; Marsden 1990):
CD(ni) = d(nj)
g  −  1 (1)
where CD(ni) is the degree centrality of bidder nj, d(nj) is the
total number of bidders that are connected to bidder nj, and g
is, as before, the total number of nodes in the network. The
bidders with higher degrees are more central, and bidders with
low degrees are those who reside on the social-periphery of the
network or who are less intensely competitively posting bids.
Second, the average degree centrality index CAD of the over-




j=1[CD(n∗) −  CD(nj)]
(g  −  1)(g  −  2) (2)
CD(n*) is the largest observed degree centrality in the network, to
normalize the degree measure, as a percentage of the network’s
maximum centrality.
The third index is a weighted form of centrality CW (Bonacich
1987). Whereas degree centrality CD and CAD treat all of an
actor’s connections to others equally, weighted centrality CW
considers the connections of the others to whom the focal actor
is connected. For example, two bidders, nj and nk, may have the
same number of connections to other bidders, but if the bidders to
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whom nj is connected are themselves highly central compared to
bidder nk’s connections, then bidder nj is more central according
to the weighting captured in this index. Indices of weighted cen-
tralities capture averages of an actor’s direct and indirect links
(cf., Google’s Page Rank algorithm). The weighted centrality
for bidder nj, CW(nj) is derived by iteratively solving:
CW(nj) =  α(I  −  βXm)−1Xm1 (3)
where α  normalizes the sum of squares of the indices to equal
the number of ties in the network, β > 0 weighs higher scores
for actors tied to other central actors, and I  and 1 are the identity
matrix and a vector of ones. Results across these three classes
of indices were consistent, so the results that follow are based
on degree centralities, unless otherwise noted.
Dyadic Bidder  Ties—Within  and  Between  Lots
Thus far, we have defined network patterns of connectivity as
bid and counter-bids for a single item as the most direct network
relational exchanges and then aggregated up for the auction-
level analyses. Dyadic ties including within-lot and between-lot
interactions further distinguishes the network patterns into two
identifiable measures, thus allowing better scrutiny of the bidder
network (cf., Boyd and Everett 1988).
At this point, we operationalize within-lot interactions
between two bidders in a lot as the number of times the two
bidders bid against each other sequentially. To capture the inten-
sity of direct rivalry between two individual bidders for an item
(Ku, Malhotra, and Murnighan 2005), we consider the maximum
number of sequential bids between any bidder pairs within a lot.
Formally, the within-lot interaction index for lot i is given by:
wli =  max(fjk) for j  =  1,  . .  ., Bi −  1,
and k  =  j  +  1,  . . .,  Bi,  (4)
where Bi is the number of bidders in lot i, and fjk the number of
bids between bidder nj and bidder nk.
Analogously, we operationalize between-lot dyadic interac-
tion as the number of lots in which two individual bidders have
both submitted bids (Brusco and Lopomo 2002). For all possi-
ble bidder pairs, we count the number of lots in which the pair
has competed against each other. For a particular lot, we take
the average of these pair-wise measures as an indicator of the








where Bi denotes the number of bidders in lot i, cljk the number of
common lots bid by bidders nj and bidder nk, and Ni the number
of bidder pairs in lot i.
Economic Covariates  and  Statistical  Controls
In addition, to statistically control for various extraneous het-
erogeneity, we include information on the artists (whether each
was emerging, established, or other artists), lot characteristics
(e.g., paper vs. canvas), and auction design characteristics (i.e.,
pre-auction low and high estimates, and opening bid). Artist
categorization was identified as per Reddy and Dass (2006),
and validated by the auction house managers. To control for
unobserved artist heterogeneity, we include a random effect in
our model to represent the individual artist who created the lot.
Specifically, to isolate the effects of bidder interactions on auc-
tion surplus, we included several other covariates to control for
still more potentially confounding variables:
• Number  of  unique  bidders  participating  in  lot  i: per the basic
economic element in the auctions literature, an often used
aggregate measure to control for the overall competition level
in single item auctions.
• Number  of  bids  per  bidder  in  lot  i: also per a simple economic
perspective from the auctions literature, another often used
aggregate measure of competition in single item auctions,
reflecting the overall activity level of bidders.
• Average  number  of  lots  bid  by  bidders  in  lot  i: given that
bidders can bid in multiple lots simultaneously, we were con-
cerned that budget constraints could lower the average budget
for each lot and affect the competition in the auction, hence
this covariate.
• Producer/Artist  characteristics  in  lot  i: Artist reputation plays
a crucial role in prices of art items (Mei and Moses 2002), pro-
viding the basis for bidders to estimate the value of the items.
Three types of artists were identified, including “established,”
“emerging,” and “others.”
• Product  characteristics  of  lot  i: Reddy and Dass (2006) found
that the medium of the art item (canvas or paper) can affect the
price formation process. Similarly, Beggs and Graddy (1997)
found that the size of art items is positively associated with
bid prices. Accordingly, in our model we control for the (log)
size of lot i and whether the art work is on paper.
Thus we model
n(Auction Surplus)i =  β0 +
10∑
j=1
βjxji +  b1u1i +  ei (6)
for lots i = 1, 2, . .  ., 199, with these specific predictors:
•  Network theory factors:
◦ x1i = within-lot dyadic bidder interaction and
◦  x2i = between-lot dyadic bidder interaction;
•  Simple economic factors:
◦ x3i = number of bidders;
◦  x4i = number of bids per bidder;
◦  x5i = average number of lots bid by bidders;
•  Control factors for this product category of auctions:
◦ x6i = 1 if the lot belonged to an established artist (=0
otherwise);
◦ x7i = 1 if the lot belonged to an emerging artist (=0 oth-
erwise);
◦ x8i = dummy variable to indicate medium (=1 if paper,
=0 if canvas);
◦ x9i = log(size of art work in square inches);
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◦  u1i = artist of lot i and b1 ∼  N(0, ψ2); ψ2 is the variance
of the random effect.
Results
Overall  Network
We first present results on the overall network, and then
results regarding the key bidders. As the auction progressed,
the number of bidders increased from 61 at the beginning of
the auction to 256 by the end of the auction. With more bidders
arriving, more bid-counterbid links are naturally formed, from
309 at the beginning of the auction to 1463 by the end of the auc-
tion. The average degree centrality of the final bidder network
is 2.914.
To statistically characterize the bidder network, it is signif-
icantly different from random, for which most of the bidders’
centralities would be concentrated around the mean. Neither is
the bidder network simplistic in being regular, for which all cen-
tralities of all bidders are equal. The bidder distribution depicts
most bidders as having a low centrality and only a few bidders
as having a large centrality. This result is significantly differ-
ent from the centrality homogeneity that would be observed in
a random network. Moreover, the distribution follows a power-
law (Barabási and Albert 1999; Katz and Wilson 1956) implying
that the bidder network is dominated by only a few highly central
bidders.
The bidder network also exhibits the “small-world” prop-
erty (Kleinberg 2000; Watts 1999). This quality is discerned
by measuring the geodesic length (i.e., the average shortest
distance) between bidders (l), and the clustering coeffi-
cient (τ) of the network, which is the average proportion
of links between the vertices within a neighborhood over
the total number of possible links in the network (where
τ = [3k(k  −  1)]/[2k(2k  −  1) + 8pk2 + 4p2k2], for k  = the num-
ber of connected nodes, and p = 0 for regular networks
and p = 1 for random networks). Small-world networks
are graphs that are highly clustered like a regular graph
(τreal   τrandom), but possess small path lengths like a random
graph (lreal ≈  lrandom). The bidder network has a high cluster-
ing coefficient (τbidder = 0.881) compared to a random network
with same number of bidders and bidder relationships (1463)
(τrandom = 0.022), but similar path length to a random network
(lbidder = 3.097 ≈  lrandom = 3.391). The properties of this bidder
network suggest the fast spread of information compared to a
random network. The small world property is reflected when
actors are connected directly and independently connected indi-
rectly such as through small clique clusters.
The network characteristics of average centrality decline as
the auction progresses, indicating network fragmentation. Fig. 2
illustrates this steady decrease in the average centrality of the
bidder network over the duration of the auction as more bid-
ders enter the auction. This trend indicates that as the network
becomes more heavily populated, a typical bidder plays a smaller
role as competition is diffusing across more actors, a pattern that
arises because in contrast, a few bidders emerge as key bidders
given their greater levels of interactive activity, including with
each other. We examine these key bidders in detail next.
Key Bidders
Auction house managers from Sotheby’s, Christie’s, Artnet,
and our data source auction house unanimously agree that the
identities of these bidders would be highly desirable information.
Currently, these auction houses collect only some bidder infor-
mation that includes the bidder’s name, address, and verification
of financial status. In some instances, auction managers may
have personal knowledge about a particular bidder’s preferences,
especially if the bidder is well known, but in most cases, for most
auction events and for most bidders, they have limited informa-
tion. Auction managers rely solely on bidder activities during
auctions for more information, which are typically limited to
the items bid on and how much money the bidders are inter-
ested in paying for them. Willingness to pay is highly correlated
with the number of lots on which a bidder bids (r  = 0.98 for
our data), but that number is not known until the end of the auc-
tion. Our weighted centrality index is nearly as highly correlated
(r = 0.89), but its advantage is that it can be computed early in
the auction event, and it can be traced to see if it changes and if
new key bidders require greater attention.
Greenleaf, Rao, and Sinha (1993) showed the importance of
the auction house, and the expectations and negotiations between
buyers and sellers. Given the three-day duration of the auctions
in this study, it is quite feasible and likely for auctioneers to
target bidders during the event. Indeed, in our discussions with
auction house managers, they acknowledge that they observe,
albeit intuitively and not systematically, that a few bidders tend
to emerge as central players, or key bidders. These bidders seem
to have disproportionately large influence on price formation
during an auction through their interactions with other bidders,
both within and between-lots, even though they often win only
a small fraction of the items sold in the end. The challenge in
practice lies in how to systematically identify these key bidders
from the observed bidding patterns.
In addition to studying networks holistically, many research
inquiries focus on smaller subsets of actors in the network who
are thought to be important in some manner. For example, dif-
fusion of innovation is thought to occur through word of mouth,
and marketers seek to identify opinion leaders who are particu-
larly influential in their recommendations. Here too, models of
the whole network can be complemented with analyses of the
“key bidders” to see their impact on bids and prices.
Network centrality measures can be used to fill these man-
agerial needs and their complementary theoretical gaps in the
literature. Their application is readily used to identify key bid-
ders based on the bidders’ dyadic interactions, the depths of their
pocket expenditures, and the intensity of their bidding activity.
Thus, using networks, key bidders were identified based on their
centrality scores. Recall the skewed distribution of bidder cen-
trality and power, whereby most bidders have low scores and a
few bidders have large scores. The five bidders with the high-
est centrality scores were the bidders named: Kyozaan, Poker,
Anonymous 3, Lord  of  the  Rings, and Anonymous  118.
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Fig. 2. Increasing cumulative number of bidders and declining centrality over auction duration. Note: This figure helps to explain the Pareto or power-law
distribution—as auctions proceed, additional new bidders join, as represented in the growing heights of the bars in the bar chart. As a result, bids are spread
among a larger number of competitors, in turn reducing the average index of overall actor centralities, as represented in the downward sloping mean centrality curve.
As auctions develop, more bids are shared across more bidders, with a minority of exceptional, “key bidders” emerging who serve as the focus of the bidding activity
in the network.
Table 2 provides a summary of these key bidders’ behaviors.
Kyozaan emerged as a highly central bidder in this auction. This
bidder entered the auction event early, bid on many lots (56),
and bid the most (182 bids). Kyozaan  had the highest number of
bidding relationships (59), also reflected in the high centrality
measures. This bidder won four of the 56 lots bid on and spent
$351,600.
Fig. 3 tracks the centrality statistics for the key bidders over
time. For a conservative comparison, the five bidders with the
next highest centrality indices are also plotted. It is clear that
the key bidders distinguish themselves early in the auction and
very clearly. The top five bidders’ behaviors, as captured by the
centrality scores, begin to differentiate themselves from the rest
of the pack as soon as time point 1—that is, only 7 hr after the
auction started. In addition, key bidders are not merely highly
connected—they are important in their impact on auction prices,
as we shall demonstrate in the set of results that follow on
prices.
Impact of  Key  Bidders  on  Auction  Prices
We modeled the effects of the potential influence of key bid-
ders on the auction process in the following manner. We studied
the final realized price as a percentage over the pre-auction low
estimate from the auction house for the lots in which the key
bidders participated. If, due to his or her participation, the key
bidder were truly influential, then these lots should realize a




Kyozaan Anonymous 3 Anonymous 118 Lord of the Rings Poker
Total $ spent $351,600 $263,423 $1,042,373 $1,011,746 $30,000
# Lots won 4 9 9 8 3
# Lots bid 56 58 18 37 65
Total # bids 182 128 104 137 152
Depth of pocket $2,630,166 $2,524,497 $2,050,638 $3,325,247 $2,967,090
Total # bid relations 59 49 24 35 48
Centrality index 178 155 149 129 95
Avg. entry time (1st bid) 0.108 0.266 0.245 0.263 0.176
Avg. exit time (last bid) 0.412 0.565 0.8 0.645 0.336
Major artists’ lots won 27, 68 10, 34, 38 42, 36, 18 50, 52, 69 41
Mean estimate lots bid $45,327 $35,658 $40,301 $44,728 $33,457
Median lots bid $15,912 $15,912 $22,165 $74,553 $37,845
# Agent bids 0 0 0 92 68
Note: These five bidders had the highest centrality scores, information that was not redundant with bidding activity (e.g., Total # bids), success (# Lots won),
expenditure (Total $ spent).
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Fig. 3. Centralities of top 5 key bidders and next 5 competitors. Note: The top 5 key bidders (Kyozaan, Poker, Anonymous 3, Lord of the Rings, and Anonymous 118)
begin to distinguish themselves in their interactions and influence even as early as the first time period. Their influence grows. As a conservative comparison, we also
plot the next 5 scoring bidders, and it is clear that even as strong as they are, they are not as central to the auction’s interactions or price outcomes as the top 5 key
bidders we identified.
To tease apart characteristics of key bidders, we created three
indices, the first based on bidder connectivity (i.e., network-
based weighted centrality indices), the second based on bidder
wealth (i.e., depth of pocket, or the maximum amount a bidder
would need to pay at any given time if the bidder won all items
currently bid upon), and the third based on bidder activity (i.e.,
the number of bids placed).
We also controlled for other determinants, including aggre-
gate competitive measures (number of bidders, number of bids
per bidder, and average number of lots bid by bidders); pro-
ducer characteristics (indicators for established and emerging
artist vs. others); product characteristics (indicator for works on
paper and size of the art work); and unobserved heterogeneity
due to different artists. Together, these data were analyzed using
the following mixed effect model:
n(Auction Surplus)i =  β0 +
13∑
j=1
βjxji +  b1u1i +  ei (9)
for i  = 1, 2, . .  ., 199 lots; x1i = number of key bidders based on
weighted centrality index; x2i = number of key bidders based on
depth of pocket; x3i = number of key bidders based on bidding
intensity; x4i = wli, within-lot dyadic bidder interaction; x5i = bli,
between-lot dyadic bidder interaction; x6i = number of bidders;
x7i = number of bids per bidder; x8i = average number of lots
bid by bidders; x9i = dummy variable to indicate if lot belonged
to an established artist; x10i = dummy variable to indicate a lot
by an emerging artist; x11i = dummy variable for medium (=1 if
paper, =0 if canvas); x12i = log(size of art work in square inches);
u1i = artist of lot i; and b1 ∼  N(0, ψ2) where ψ2 is the variance
of the random effect.
The results in Table 3 show that it is more useful to identify
“key bidders” as defined by their network measure of weighted
centrality index than on the basis of their depth of pocket or their
bidding intensity. The effect of key bidders based on network
centrality is positive (β  = 0.084) and significant (p = 0.025), and
note that neither depth of pocket nor numbers of bids was sig-
nificant. This finding is important in demonstrating the utility
of networks in studying bidding and counterbidding behaviors
Table 3







0.084 (0.025)* 1.83 0.061 (0.024)*
Key bidders by
depth of pocket




−0.014 (0.034) 2.00 0.017 (0.027)
Within-lot dyadic
interaction




−0.105 (0.007)** 3.02 −0.066 (0.002)**
Covariates:
Number of bidders 0.650 (0.006)** 1.78 0.678 (0.005)**
Number of bids
per bidder
0.533 (0.020)** 2.78 0.334 (0.026)**
Average # lots bid
by bidders
−0.019 (0.037) 3.57 −0.010 (0.029)
Established artist −0.022 (0.028) 1.36 −0.016 (0.023)
Emerging artist 0.042 (0.031) 1.57 n.a.a
Works on paper −0.014 (0.026) 1.35 0.058 (0.029)
Size of the
artwork
0.017 (0.090) 1.58 0.048 (0.0001)
Adjusted R-square 0.92 0.91
Bidder interactions within-lots enhance final prices and bidders competing
between-lots lower final prices (controlling for overall activity per #bidders
and bids per bidder).
a The replication study featured only works by established artists.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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Table 4
The effect of key bidders on price.
Artist Lot Medium Opening bid Low estimate High estimate Key bidder present? Final price Profit
Barwe A Drawing $3,650 $4,545 $5,685 No $7,150 57.32%
B Drawing $3,650 $4,545 $5,685 Yes $11,650 156.33%
Souza A Painting $64,000 $80,000 $90,000 No $151,500 89.4%
B Painting $64,000 $80,000 $90,000 Yes $265,000 231.1%
given that the results are distinctive apart from economic or
financial descriptors of the bidders.
The positive and significant effect of network-based key bid-
ders on auction surplus suggests that the presence of a key bidder
enhances the auction surplus; additionally, across all lots, the
more key bidders were bidding on more of the lots, the more
realized surplus would be enhanced. Perhaps these key bidders
were indeed the art experts referred to by Roth and Ockenfels
(2002): participants who would be better informed about the
items than others, such that their presence in a lot would signal a
higher value of the item. On average, lots for which at least one
key bidder was present (n  = 131) realized a higher (3.12) auc-
tion surplus compared to lots where no key bidders participated
(2.45; the difference between the surplus for lots that included
key bidders and those that did not was significant; t197 = 2.23,
p = 0.026). There were also dramatic differences between these
key bidders and others with respect to the speed of the price for-
mation. On average, prices of lots in which at least one key bidder
participated exceeded the pre-auction high estimate value in one
day, compared to nearly two days for lots with no key bidders
bidding.
Finally, we tested whether the key bidders moderate the
effects on other factors such as the number of bids. For instance,
many papers have shown that the number of bids has a positive
effect on price, but is the effect even stronger in the presence
of key bidders? To test this idea, we examined the highest
bids of non-key bidders who bid on items where key bidders
participated and also on other similar items where the key
bidders did not participate. In Table 4, we offer two examples
where several variables are kept constant: the artist, the opening
bids, the low and high estimates, and the medium of the art.
The table shows the profits are greater when key bidders were
involved (e.g., $11,650 vs. $7,150, and $265,000 vs. $151,500).
In general, we found that these non-key bidders bid more
(t = 2.43, p < 0.05) and paid higher prices (on average $14,488
more, t = 2.02, p < 0.05) on items where key bidders participated
compared to items where key bidders did not participate (the
difference between the surplus for lots that included key bidders
and those that did not was significant; t197 = 2.23, p  = 0.026).
We conclude that key bidders drive up price (and surplus), and
they also make others (non-key bidders) reach deeper into their
wallets.
Thus, regarding key bidders, we note first that network cen-
trality explained significantly more auction surplus variance than
simple economic heuristics such as the number of bids and depth
of pocket. Second, items on which at least one key bidder par-
ticipated yielded significantly higher auction surplus than lots
in which they did not participate. Third, non-key bidders tend to
bid more and pay higher prices for items where key bidders par-
ticipated than for items where the key bidders did not participate.
Fig. 4 organizes the theory testing we pursued in this paper.
The dashed line represents a simple economic benchmark based
on the prediction that more bidders over time create more
competition and price increases. The network theorizing is com-
paratively richer. Where the linear-like economic prediction
would forecast that the price continues to climb steadily, net-
work structures begin to develop (e.g., point a in the figure) and
create synergies (points b and c), accelerating prices upward.
Similarly, toward the end of the auction, the economic prediction
simply continues to rise in a steady state, whereas the network
structure identifies that less concentrated bidders begin to fall
away, with prices soon reaching their asymptotes. The figure
also distinguishes the boost that key bidders provide, in that
their presence surpasses the economic line, and their absence
suppresses prices.
Within and  Between  Lots  Bidder  Interactions  and  Model
Tests
Table 3 also presents the parameter estimates of the model
testing the within- and between-lot effects on auction surplus.
As anticipated, high intensity within-lot dyadic interactions (Eq.
(4)) increased auction surplus (β  = 0.137, p  < 0.0001), and high
intensity between-lot interactions (Eq. (5)) decreased auction
surplus (β  = −0.105, p < 0.0001). There may be several expla-
nations for these results; one explanation for the decline in profits
with greater between-lot bidding is probably most parsimo-
niously a budget constraint. Similar items may draw competition
across the lots, but budget constraints would create the dimin-
ishing effect even when the lots involved are not particularly
similar items.
The covariates of number of bidders (β  = 0.650) and bids per
bidder (β  = 0.533) showed strong positive and statistically sig-
nificant (p  < 0.0001) effects. We also controlled for the possible
effect of the average number of lots per bidder, in case budgets
constrained prices. The adjusted R2 = 0.92, suggesting a solid
model fit.
To check the robustness of our model, we investigated issues
of: (1) multicollinearity and (2) omission of other possible
covariates in our analysis. Regarding multicollinearity, we com-
puted the variance inflation factor for each of the variables
and found no parameters to have values greater than 3.57 (see
Table 3). Maruyama (1998, p. 64) suggests that any value below
6 indicates absence of multicollinearity. Second, we computed
the condition index of the model (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch
1980), which should not exceed 30, and ours did not.
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Fig. 4. Using networks to understand auction processes and prices. PNT-high, network theory forecast for high centrality or presence of key bidders; pe, baseline
simple economic forecast function regarding competition from number of bidders. PNT-low, network theory forecast for low centrality or absence of key bidders.
To test the soundness of our model, we considered five omit-
ted variables whose effects we hoped would be minimal: (1) the
number of bidder pairs present in a lot, (2) the number of latent
bidders present in a lot, (3) the number of proxy bids in a lot, (4)
starting bid, and (5) inter-bid time. The first, number of bidder
pairs, is highly correlated (0.891) with the number of bidders
placing bids in a lot, which is already represented in the model,
thus, rendering the issue of omitted variables moot. As a measure
of the second, latent bidders, we considered bidders from other
items who are most likely to participate in the focal item, specif-
ically those by the same artist (cf., Chan, Kadiyali, and Park
2007). For the third, we captured data from the auction house
regarding bidders’ maximum bids to serve as analogous to proxy
bids. The fourth variable was directly recorded from the auction
data, and the fifth variable was calculated from the bid history.
Rerunning the model with these four additional covariates—the
number of latent bidders, the number of proxy bids, starting bid,
and inter-bid time—yielded non-significance for all of them, and
our previous findings remained unchanged.
These results show that dyadic bidder interactions are signif-
icant in explaining variation in observed auction surplus across
lots, offering clear empirical evidence that these interactions
matter in simultaneous online auctions. Specifically, the results
demonstrate that, everything else being equal: (1) in lots where
bidder pairs bid on more lots together (i.e., higher “between-lot
interaction”), auction surplus tends to be significantly lower;
and (2) in lots where two bidders directly outbid each other
more frequently (i.e., higher “within-lot interaction”), auction
surplus tends to be significantly higher. The first of these results
is presumably due to a limited share of wallet; that is, we have
shown that the presence of key bidders in the auction of any
single item enhances the profit realized for that item, yet having
these bidders bid upon many items appears to push their limits
against their financial constraints. To minimize between-lot
competition and the resulting drop in profits, auction house
managers might sell only one item from any given set of similar
products as a time (e.g., during one auction event), so that the
effect of substitution is diminished.
Measure Robustness
As a check on the operationalizations used in this study, we
examined two other alternative explanations. First, while our
bidder networks had deep pockets, one might argue that early
bids are low and therefore can be outbid easily, compared to later,
higher bids. Thus, we sought to examine whether the influence
of a bidder was due to its being a relatively high bid or an early
one. Therefore, we developed a new score for bidders termed
“value influence” of bidder nj, or vij, computed as the ratio of
the final bid by a bidder for a lot over the final price of all
the lots bid by the bidder. If a bidder bids early in the auction
only, those bids will have less influence than if bid later in the
auction. This index correlated with weighted centrality r = 0.60;
that is, the value index is not completely redundant with the
network measure we have been modeling, but the correlation is
sufficiently substantial as to be indicative that our results are at
least implicitly also capturing monetary dynamics of network
interactions.
Second, one might alternatively argue that the bidders the
auction houses should pay most attention to are not the key
bidders—the people in the network who we have illustrated have
an effect over other bidders, series of bids, build-ups of prices,
and so forth—but instead those bidders who spend the most. It
should not be surprising that the final amount bid by each bidder
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for different lots at the end of the auction is correlated with how
much he or she spends in the first half of the auction (β  = 0.233,
p < 0.0001). However, if the auction hosts wish to identify those
likely big spenders sooner, they can use the weighted centrality
index, which may be computed in an ongoing manner. The net-
work descriptors predict total expenditure even better than the
first half sub-totals (β  = 0.310, p  < 0.0001). When both network
centrality and first half sub-totals are in the same model predict-
ing overall expenditure, the network predictor is still significant
(β = 0.390, p  < 0.0001), and the first half sub-totals are insignifi-
cant, a result not attributable to overwhelming multicollinearity,
as these predictors themselves are correlated only by r  = 0.310.
Finally, to assess whether any endogeneity may be a concern
in our results, we conducted an alternative analyses. Specifically,
we fit a pair of simultaneous equations, in which one equation
is the model whose results are presented in Table 3, and another
in which the number of bidders is modeled as a function of the
variables that we have that can represent variability attributable
to the artists (whether they are established or new), and the art-
work product itself (its medium and its size). The findings in
Table 3 were completely re-affirmed.
Validation and  Replication  Studies
The network analyses yielded interesting empirical results.
To seek external validation regarding whether a network
approach could be a meaningful framework within which to
study auctions, we interviewed eight managers of major art auc-
tion houses and four known collectors of this class of art. We
also conducted an online survey of contemporary art collectors
and dealers who are regular bidders at this auction house. Forty-
one respondents participated in the study in which they were
asked about their bidding behavior. The items were 7-point Lik-
ert scales (7 = strongly agree). The survey results indicated that
bidders indeed take notice of and identify their competitors in
online auctions (e.g., through nicknames).
The results indicated that, in fact, most bidders (80%)
browse through the web pages to investigate who is bidding
on what items (mean = 5.54, p < .01 compared to the mid-point
of 4.0). They (78%) also recognize nicknames of other bid-
ders if they competed against each other for more than one
item (mean = 5.29, p  < 01). Regarding competitiveness, many
of the respondents (54%) suggested that they are inclined to
“win at all cost” when engaged in a head-to-head encounter with
another bidder (mean = 4.61, p  < .05). Thus, a network approach
to studying auctions is relevant and could be quite fruitful,
whether the network is truly social or a metaphor enabling the
application of the models. While this study is small in scale, it
seems to strengthen an argument for the external validity of this
research.
To determine the generalizability of our results, we examined
the replicability of the analysis of another sales event from the
same online auction house run six months later. We found sim-
ilar centrality distributions among the bidders, the bidder data
showed properties of small world networks, and the key bidders
had similar effects on the auction outcome. On average, the lots
on which the key bidders (only three key bidders were identified)
Table 5
Study results and related theoretical framework.
Study results Theoretical framework and
references
Bid, counter-bid, bidder nodes Graph theory: Marsden (1990)
Bidder interactions Graph theory: Davis (1963), Heider
(1958), Katz and Wilson (1956)
Network characteristics, power
law
Network theory: Barabási and Albert
(1999), Bonacich (1972)
Small world properties Network theory: Kleinberg (2000),
Watts (1999)
Identifying key bidders Graph theory and network theory:
Bonacich (1987), Freeman (1979),
Knoke and Yang (2007), Nieminen
(1973)
Within-lot interactions Auction fever: Ku et al. (2005),
Heyman, Orhun, and Ariely (2004)
Between-lot interactions Dynamic price competition: Boyd
and Everett (1988), Krackhardt
(1988)
Price dynamics Price evolution: Reddy and Dass
(2006), Bapna et al. (2008), Borle,
Boatwright, and Kadane (2006)
Importance of key bidders Auction theory: Roth and Ockenfels
(2002), Wilcox (2000)
Impact of key bidders on auction
prices
Auction theory and price evolution:
Reddy and Dass (2006), Bapna et al.
(2008), Wilcox (2000)
bid realized a higher price over the pre-auction low estimate, and
the time taken to cross the pre-auction high estimate was signif-
icantly faster for these lots as compared to others. These results
appear in the final column of Table 3 for comparative purposes.
Discussion
Auctions formats, bidder behavior, and the importance of
bidder relations in auctions are well recognized in the aca-
demic community. The challenges to analyze such relations have
always been the availability of desired data and the method-
ologies to analyze them. The current research contributes by
introducing a network analysis approach to analyze these rela-
tionships and to develop ways to represent the bid-counterbid
interactions among bidders and the resulting bidder networks
that are formed.
Theoretical  Contributions
This research offers contributions to both the auctions and
networks literatures. Table 5 maps our findings onto the related
theoretical frameworks in which they belong. In particular, the
findings from the bidder connections and the resulting bidder
networks are embedded in graph theory. Our research points
network scholars in another direction in measuring sequences
of interactions in a very meaningful setting. Just as the network
element of this research afforded new insights into auctions,
the auctions scenario may encourage networks researchers to
relate their portfolio of structural indices to other measures
on the actors or groups to establish convergent validity. This
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research also strengthens the stability of the network findings
when the patterns of interaction are aggregated across auction
bid items. For the auction researcher, this research shows how
network methods may help auction modelers and auction man-
agers achieve an even more detailed understanding of the micro
moves, bid to bid to another answering bid, of how the eventual
sought goal of sales prices are accumulated and derived.
This research also provides an endorsement of the importance
of networks and incorporating relational ties into studies such
as these auctions. When we compared different means of iden-
tifying key bidders, we found that classifying bidders on sheer
economic grounds, such as their financial bases and qualifica-
tions, performed less well than identifying bidders using network
analytical methods. This information is obviously important to
auction house managers and thereby also to scholars building
auction theories. Specifically, bids are not independently iso-
latable phenomena, and it would be best to model them using
techniques suitable to such structured data, such as network
models, as shown in this research.
This research results in a new bidder behavior model, which
consists of the formation of bidder connectivity, localized dyadic
competitions, and dominating roles of key bidders. Our research
begins to map the dynamic nature of networks, how they are
formed and evolve (e.g., Figs. 2 and 3), but we have just begun
to tap a topic that should prove to be a fruitful line of inquiry
for future research. Using network analysis, we show that bid-
ders implicitly make connections with other bidders during
bid-counterbid actions. After representing these connections in
network form, we show that evolution of this network affects
the auction outcome. In addition, we demonstrate that the role
of those network-based “Key Bidders” has a positive impact on
auction surplus and a positive effect on price dynamics at the
beginning of auctions. The effectiveness of network theory is
highlighted when recalling that the helpfulness of the presence
of key bidders toward realizing higher prices is true only when
key bidders were defined or identified using measures of network
centralities, and not when using simple economic measures, such
as depth of wallet.
This research should make clear that the use of network mod-
els and theories can contribute to the literature on auctions. In
both the model and in the means of identifying the key bid-
ders, the network approach contributed significantly, above and
beyond existing, economic-based predictions. Network indica-
tors regarding within-auction dyads, between-auction dyads,
and key bidders were all important beyond sheer numbers of
bids or bidders. We also believe that this study provides con-
tributions to networks domains. Much of network theory and
methods are as yet relatively new, and as a result, it is often
perceived to be a sufficient contribution to simply describe a
network structure. In this research, we have used network struc-
tures to understand and test important consequential dependent.
Thus we have fortified networks theories and methods in this
research in making clear that it is not just the case that networks
exist or that they are interesting: they are important and can be
used to explain other phenomena.
In terms of limitations, one concern that can arise with
sequential bidding in online auctions is the possibility of shilling
that is, having a confederate bidding enthusiastically to drive up
prices, a practice that is illegal in most settings. Theoretically,
shilling could have been present in the auctions from which our
data are derived. However, given that the first bid is always above
the reserve price, and that these items carry relatively high price
tags, we expect that the presence of shilling in these auctions
would be minimal.
Managerial  Implications
Our research shows that key bidders may be identified very
quickly after the opening of an auction (even after just a few
hours). As a result, an auction house manager can be poised
to quickly redirect resources and attention to these potentially
influential bidders. Preferential treatment may seem antithetical
to the democracy inherent to auctions, but it is naïve and poor
business practice to not pay greater attention to more valuable
customers (bidders). All passengers on a flight arrive en route,
but frequent fliers may travel more comfortably; all gamblers
have an equal chance in Vegas, but big spenders get free drinks.
In our case, the key bidders as identified via our network meth-
ods, accounted for $3 million in purchases and the successful
purchase of 33 lots (17% of the total lots auctioned).
Our research is also useful to the auction house manager
after one auction in preparation for another. Prior to the open-
ing of many auctions, auction houses arrange viewing events
during which bidders can inspect items that will be put up for
auction. Special invitations to these events are sent to potential
prospects, primarily as a function of past purchases and regis-
trations. The process is inefficient, with the invitations being
cast with a wide net. Using our network modeling, an auction
house manager could update their database by including a new
set of potentially attractive bidders—our key bidders—based on
characteristics different from the satisfaction of wealth criteria.
Additional invitations would be issued to these key bidders (thus
based on bidding performance at past auctions) to solicit another
group of potentially profitable bidders. There would probably
be some overlap between the two sets—the traditional pre-view
bidders and those identified via their network activities, but the
overlap is unlikely to be complete (for our study, r2 = 0.28), so
the first set would presumably be enhanced by the second. More
information about potentially good bidders is better for the auc-
tion house manager in maintaining and purifying their customer
management relationship systems. Our auction house contact
has used our methods to revise their invite lists and have been
highly satisfied with the results (recently featured in the New
York Times, available from the authors).
From the perspective of the auction house manager, key
bidders were helpful in driving up prices, even for lots the bidder
did not ultimately purchase. The engagement of key bidders in
bidding on these other lots generated additional bidding activity
and the attention of other bidders, and of course, where there
is more “bidding activity,” prices rise. Auction house managers
could offer incentives to these key bidders to bid on less popular
lots, including price discounts, rebates, or other benefits to
get the bidder interested in a lot that previously he or she had
shown little interest in, to perhaps result in that bidder pursuing
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the art item, or perhaps simply to spark more action among
other bidders who would observe the presence of a key bidder
considering the item. These incentives could easily be issued in
real time as the auction progresses, as it becomes clearer which
lots are naturally drawing the attention of the key bidders, and
which other lots could use some assistance.
Bidders can also watch for the presence of key bidders. Their
bids provide positive signals about the desirability of an item,
which may fortify the art collector’s determination to achieve the
purchase. At the same time, we showed that key bidders drives
up sales prices, so the art investor may turn away from such lots,
if they are seeking value purchases. Typically, auction houses
such as the one studied here, post in real time during the auction
the top 10 lots by activity (highest value lots, lots with most #
of bids). We propose that in addition to the lot information, the
auction house present real time information on bidders (bidders
with most bids; bidders with highest bid, bidders with most lots).
This makes it easy for potential bidders to identify and follow
key bidders and the lots that they are bidding on. This will help
the formation of the dyadic interactions and the bidder network
which we have shown affects the auction outcomes.
Finally, on a more general note, while the focus in this paper
has been on network models as being essential in applicability to
interdependent data, networks also provide a different means of
conceptualizing auctions, with their emphasis on capturing the
bid-counter-bid exchanges as patterns of bidder connectivity.
Given that bidders do not increase their activity independently,
an auction house manager would benefit from sharing and mak-
ing more explicit information about lots for which there seems
to be heavy concentrations of bidding activities. Doing so may
attract a key bidder to the auction, as well as other bidders with
whom the key bidder would spar or compete, creating a flurry
of bidding exchanges, obviously thereby increasing final sale
prices.
Conclusions
In sum, we conducted this research to understand: the micro
process of bidders interacting in an auction, the formation of
bidder networks and their evolution by defining network ties
as bid and counter-bid actions and reactions, the presence and
identification of key bidders or bidders whose bidding behavior
and apparent influence on the auction stand out, and complexities
inherent to simultaneous auctions given the broad set of within-
lot and between-lot connections. We believe that our research
and this network approach provide insights on both the process
and bidders which contributes to and complements the existing
marketing literature on auctions.
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